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Abstract 
Aesthetic innovations have become increasingly important appropriation mechanisms for firms. 
Since 2003, the number of design patent applications (to protect aesthetic innovations) has tripled 
compared to doubling in the numbers of both patent and trademark applications. However, despite 
the growing interest of firms in aesthetic innovations, knowledge on their determinants is limited. 
Work on labor mobility within the innovation studies literature focuses mainly on discussion of 
scientists as crucial for creating technological innovations. This paper adds to work on labor 
mobility and innovation by examining whether this holds in the case of designers' mobility and 
aesthetic innovations. Does the hiring of a new designer generate more aesthetic innovations than in 
a matched firm, which does not hire a designer? What is the importance of prior experience with 
aesthetic innovation in the receiving firm for the firm's absorptive capacity linked to translating the 
hiring of a designer into aesthetic innovation? We use a unique dataset containing information on 
firms, their hiring of designers, and their aesthetic innovation activity measured by design 
applications (design patents). Our findings show that hiring a designer does increase the likelihood 
of producing an aesthetic innovation. Hence, designers are a determinant of aesthetic innovations. 
However, in order to benefit fully from hiring a designer the firm needs prior experience in 
aesthetic innovation. 
 
Keywords: Designer, aesthetic innovation, design rights, labor mobility  
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1. Introduction 
On June 28th 2007, just 1 day before Apple introduced its legendary first iPhone, it applied for 92 
industrial design (ID) patents1 protecting the design, shape and icons related to the iPhone2. Apple 
had produced a technical innovation whose aesthetics were distinguishable from any other phone on 
the market. Steve Jobs, Apple’s then CEO, pointed out the “iPhone is a revolutionary and magical 
product that is literally five years ahead of any other mobile phone”3. The consumers’ response was 
euphoric, and within 3 months Apple sold over 1.4 million iPhones. Apple has been successful in 
creating devices, which integrate technical and aesthetic innovations. However, it is not alone in 
emphasizing aesthetic design related aspects to appropriate from innovations. A recent analysis 
comparing the use globally of IDs and patents as appropriation mechanisms, shows that while 
technical innovations protected by patents doubled between 2003 and 2013, the use of IDs to 
appropriate the value from aesthetic innovations, tripled (Alcacer, Beukel et al. 2015). However, 
despite the enormous industry focus on aesthetic innovations, there is little published research on 
what underlies innovations with dramatic new aesthetic designs. A very relevant and unexplored 
question is what type of human capital does the firm require in its knowledge base to enable the 
creation of aesthetic innovations? 
To address this question, we draw on work in innovation studies on human capital, 
labor mobility and problem-solving. The literature on labor mobility show that the hiring of 
engineers and scientists can be a driver of technological innovation, and that the mobility of 
scientists/engineers has implications for both the receiving and departing firms’ technological 
innovation output (Almeida and Kogut 1999, Hoisl 2007, Agarwal, Ganco et al. 2009, Marc Gruber, 
                                                            1	  Design	  patents	  are	  known	  as	  industrial	  designs	  in	  some	  countries.	  
2 Designview: www.tmdn.org/accessed the 24th February 2015 3	  Apple	  Press	  Release:	  http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/01/09Apple-­‐Reinvents-­‐the-­‐Phone-­‐with-­‐iPhone.html	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Dietmar Harhoff et al. 2013). Firms can acquire knowledge beneficial for generating new 
technological innovations, by hiring scientists and engineers (Singh and Agrawal 2011). In this 
paper, we focus on the type of knowledge base that is the most beneficial for creating aesthetic 
innovations in terms of the characteristics and value of a typical firm employee who moves between 
firms. There is a rich stream of literature on problem solving, which provides information on how 
designers act in the design thinking process. This literature discusses how design thinking leading to 
aesthetic innovations differs from the innovation processes leading to technical innovations, and 
emphasizes different skills and methods (e.g. Lawson 1979, Cross 1982, Buchanan 1992, Glen, 
Suciu et al. 2014). While this literature stream has not been linked to innovation studies or to 
particular innovation outcomes such as aesthetic innovation, it helps to identify designers as the 
main drivers of aesthetic innovation, and to explain the mechanisms by which this type of human 
capital enables firms to create aesthetic innovations.  
In this paper we explore whether the hiring of a new designer generates more aesthetic 
innovations than are produced in a matched firm, which does not hire a designer, and the conditions 
moderating the effect of hiring a designer. We explore a unique and detailed dataset containing 
information on firms, their employees, their new hires and their aesthetic innovation activities, 
measured by design patent applications. We use a matched sample technique to compare firms, 
which hire a designer versus non-hiring firms. Our findings show that hiring a designer increases 
the likelihood of aesthetic innovation, and also that firms with prior experience of aesthetic 
innovation are more likely to apply for design registrations. We also find a positive moderating 
effect of firms with prior experience of generating aesthetic innovations on the effect of hiring a 
designer on aesthetic innovation outcomes.   
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Our contribution to the current literature is two-fold. First, we add to the scarce 
literature on aesthetic innovation. Although the term has been in use for some time (Christensen 
1995), prior studies rely on case study approaches to identify both the nature of the processes 
leading to aesthetic innovations (Tran 2010) and the network effects of generating aesthetic 
innovation (Salter and Gann 2003). The determinants of the occurrence of and large N empirical 
studies on this type of innovation are scarce, with only one study highlighting the differences in 
occurrences based on industry (Filitz, Henkel et al. 2014). To our knowledge, the present paper is 
the first to explore the use of design registrations as an output measure for aesthetic innovation and 
to link it to the hiring of designers. We add to research on labor mobility by empirically 
investigating the mobility of designers and their importance for aesthetic innovation outcomes. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical 
setting, presents the theory and formulations our hypotheses on labor mobility in relation to prior 
experience and its moderating effect on hiring designers. Section 3 introduces our unique dataset 
and the matching process. Section 4 presents our findings and section 5 concludes. 
2. Mobility of designers and their contribution to aesthetic innovative output 
Hiring is a means used by firms to generate innovation. By hiring a new employee the 
firm can acquire knowledge. Knowledge is a highly important firm resource (Grant 1996, Kogut 
and Zander 1996). The new knowledge brought by new recruits is integrated with the firm's existing 
knowledge (Lippman and Rumelt 1982, Coff 1997). This process of generating new knowledge via 
hiring has been described as ‘learning by hiring’ (Singh and Agrawal 2011). In terms of generating 
technological innovation, prior research shows that firms use hiring to acquire new technological 
competencies in order to develop capabilities to enter new technological areas (Rosenkopf and 
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Almeida 2003, Palomeras and Melero 2009, Singh and Agrawal 2011), and introduce new types of 
products into the market (Rao and Drazin 2002, Dokko and Rosenkopf 2010). 
Several studies show that mobility of scientists and engineers affects the technical 
innovation output of both the original firm and the hiring firm (see e.g. Almeida and Kogut 1999, 
Hoisl 2007, Agarwal, Ganco et al. 2009). The knowledge acquired by the scientist/engineer while 
working for the old employer is transferred to the new employer through the hiring process (Pakes 
and Nitzan 1983, Kim and Marschke 2005). It provides the hiring firm with access to new 
knowledge previously unavailable internally. . However, since aesthetic innovation is related to the 
design not the technical components of a product (Christensen 1995, Sanderson and Uzumeri 1995, 
Salter and Gann 2003, Eisenman 2013), the hiring of engineers and scientists is unlikely to have an 
impact on the creation of aesthetic innovations. 
In order to understand the human capital needed to allow firms to create aesthetic 
innovations we draw on work on designers and design thinking. Designers solve the innovation task 
related problems of shape, context and product forms (Buchanan 1992) through explorative learning 
involving trial and error to find a solution (Lawson 1979). The literature shows that the problem-
solving processes of designers are different from those of scientists (e.g. Lawson 1979, Cross 1982). 
Lawson (1979) suggests that the scientist's approach to problem solving can be described as the 
traditional rational problem-solving paradigm, whereas the designer's approach to problem solving 
is described as design-thinking (Glen, Suciu et al. 2014).  
Schön (1983) observed that in the process of design making, learning by doing provides 
new stimuli which have a positive influence on the aesthetic innovative process, and that designers 
are able to navigate problems which can be characterized as ill structured. Thus, the cognitive 
process involved in these two approaches, design-thinking vs. rational problem solving, is 
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fundamentally different. One of the main ways that the work of designers differs from the rational 
paradigm is that it combines the exploration and exploitation phases. Glen (2014 p.657) describes it 
as: “Although the design process may begin with some initial specifications, clients and customers 
often do not know what they want until they can see what they can get. This reinforces the solution-
based, iterative nature of the design process.” Designers differ from scientists also in the 
development process methodology; designers often rely on observational and ethnographic 
methodologies (Kelley 2001, Beckman and Barry 2007). Therefore, designers are expected to be 
able to conduct a different set of innovative activities, using a different approach from that used by 
scientists in technological innovation.  
Aesthetic innovation is another type of innovation which can be viewed as an additional 
external layer on a technological innovation (e.g. Clark 1985) or as an integrated part of the 
innovation in which the link between the aesthetic innovation and the technological innovation is 
central to the generation of a successful new product (Christensen 1995, Sanderson and Uzumeri 
1995, Salter and Gann 2003, Eisenman 2013). Eisenman (2013 p. 332) emphasizes the value created 
by designers as “visible design attributes, such as color, shape and texture, allow producers to 
explain what their products do and how best to use them, to excite users in a way that generates 
sales, and to extend the basic functionalities of their products by highlighting their symbolic 
meanings” (), and suggests that the strategic use of aesthetic innovation is a major issue in the 
commercialization of a technological innovation. The production of a technological innovation with 
no reference to design, shape, color and texture may reduce the attraction for the consumer/buyer 
since there is no triggering of affect (Verganti 2006) which has been found to generate higher sales 
(Bloch 1995, Gemser and Leenders 2001, Hertenstein, Platt et al. 2005). 
7 
 
Therefore, based on the mechanisms related to the mobility of hiring designers, and 
firms' learning by hiring, we argue that in hiring a designer the firm is employing a type of human 
capital, namely design capability, which enables it to generate aesthetic innovations. These aesthetic 
innovations are created based on the problem solving, e.g. the design thinking processes which 
designers employ. The methods used in a design thinking process are based in ethnography and 
observation. By hiring a designer the firm is adopting a design knowledge base which has a positive 
impact on the likelihood of generating aesthetic innovations that are add-ons to a technological 
innovation or part of a product where the technical and aesthetic are fully integrated. Based on the 
knowledge based literature, the labor mobility literature and the human capital literature on design 
thinking we hypothesize that: 
H1: The firm's hiring of a designer is associated with a higher probability that the firm will produce 
aesthetic innovation output. 
 
While the process of learning-by-hiring can be used to gain access to new types of 
knowledge, this knowledge may not be directly applicable by the hiring firm. The literature on 
organizational learning shows that the firm's ability to acquire and apply new external knowledge is 
limited by the firm’s own experience and expertise (Nelson and Winter 1982). Learning by doing is 
a core mechanism for the creation of an internal knowledge base (Argote 1993) which can be 
exploited by the firm to generate innovation (Levitt and March 1988). The firm essentially follows 
a learning curve related to improving its ability to develop aesthetic innovation based on prior 
experience (Argote 1999), which perceives organizational learning as change to the organization's 
knowledge as a function of experience (Argote and Miron-Spektor 2011). This process of learning 
from prior experience leads to the generation of new capabilities built on existing capabilities in a 
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process of ‘competence leveraging’ (Miller 2003, Danneels 2007) to create a new capability based 
on the performance of an activity using patterned behavior (Helfat and Winter 2011). This concept 
emphasizes learning-by-doing as a core mechanism for the creation of the knowledge required by 
the firm to generate innovation (Levitt and March 1988, Huber 1991). It is related closely to the 
concept of absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990) which is required for the firm to 
implement new knowledge without prior experience and to interpret and understand this new 
knowledge. A firm with experience of developing aesthetic innovations and registration the 
associated design rights will be more likely to be able to exploit this new knowledge. Thus, our 
second hypothesis is that: 
H2: The firm's prior experience of aesthetic innovation is associated with a higher probability of 
producing new aesthetic innovation output. 
Engaging in learning-by-hiring to complement the firm's existing knowledge is focused 
often on the exploration of distant knowledge through broad search to develop new capabilities 
(Song, Almeida et al. 2003), (Danneels 2002). A firm with no prior experience in aesthetic 
innovations will engage in more distant search to identify the capabilities necessary to develop 
aesthetic innovations. Hiring a designer with experience in aesthetic innovation increases the 
likelihood that the firm will develop aesthetic innovations since the knowledge which diffuses via 
the learning by hiring process can fill the knowledge gaps in the innovation process (Bessen and 
Maskin 2009). 
 Similarly, firms experienced in aesthetic innovation can benefit from learning by 
hiring. The knowledge and experience required to develop aesthetic innovations can be seen as core 
firm assets. In this case, the new knowledge brought via the hiring process can be seen as a 
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complementary asset (Teece 1986) which combined with the firm's core assets should create new 
value. 
 While both experienced and inexperienced firms can benefit from implementing new 
knowledge in their innovation process, the overall impact differs among firms. Also, for firms with 
no experience of aesthetic innovation, implementing the new knowledge gained through the hiring 
process can be problematic. The implementation of new external knowledge is associated with 
multiple challenges such as a lack of efficient knowledge sharing processes within the firm 
(Tushman and Scanlan 1981), resistance to change (Ford, Ford et al. 2008) and dissimilarity 
between the internal and external knowledge bases (Lane and Lubatkin 1998). The new knowledge 
must be adapted to, and implemented in existing routines and processes (Hoetker and Agarwal 
2007). In this process, prior experience helps the firm develop the organizational routines necessary 
to combine the new external knowledge with its existing internal knowledge (Zahra and George 
2002). This prior experience builds organizational memory, resulting in a more positive response 
within the organization and reducing potential resistance to change (Walsh and Ungson 1991). Thus, 
firms experienced in aesthetic innovation will be able to apply the new knowledge to re-enforce 
existing capabilities (Teece 1986), and utilize the external knowledge to provide access to new 
ideas, prompting development of new products (Grant and Baden-Fuller 2004). For firms with no 
experience of aesthetic innovation will benefit more from the access to new knowledge acquired 
through the hiring process, and it can be argued that these firms will benefit more from a larger 
potential gain in knowledge. However, realizing these benefits requires experience and a level of 
existing knowledge. Prior research shows the benefit of experience for exploiting external 
knowledge, described by Inkpen and Pien (2006 p. 781)as: “What can be learned is directly related 
to what is already known”. First with no prior experience and fewer capabilities will be less able to 
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internalize and apply the new external knowledge. A certain level of absorptive capacity is required 
to integrate the new knowledge(Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Our third hypothesis is: 
H3.Hiring a designer is associated with a higher probability of developing a new aesthetic 
innovation for firms with experience of aesthetic innovation compared to firms with no experience 
of aesthetic innovation. 
3. Data and Method 
Data on design registrations by Danish firms in the period 2000 to 2010 collected from 
OHIM4, DKPTO5 and the German DPMA6, constitute our core data. We draw on three sources of 
design registrations since firms operating only in the domestic market tend to register their designs 
only in Denmark, while firms with a more international focus apply to international patent offices. 
The data were retrieved from OHIM’s Design View database, covering designs registered in the 
European Union, DKPTO’s PVSOnline database, covering designs registered in Denmark, and the 
German online database DPMA for German designs registered in Germany. These databases use a 
proprietary internal firm identifier, which is incompatible with the identifier used by Statistics 
Denmark, the source of our firm and individual-level data; for this reason we conducted a manual 
merging process based on firm names. In collaboration with DKPTO the registrants of these design 
rights were identified and a unique firm identifier associated with each registrant using the CVR 
registry of Danish firms. A total of 10,595 OHIM design registrations, 1,725 Danish design 
registrations and 521 German design registrations were identified and matched to firm identifiers. 
After matching the data to the available registry data from Statistics Denmark, we were left with 
10,243 OHIM designs, 1,665 Danish designs and 521 German designs, a total of 12,429 designs 
                                                            4	  Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market	  5	  Danish Patent and Trademark Office	  
6 National German design registrations (covering only the German jurisdiction) 
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from 1,457 firms. Individual design registrations with no firm identifier were excluded because they 
could not be matched to the firm registry.  
 Data on design registrations were merged with the firm and individual-level data 
provided by Statistics Denmark. The panel structure data on individuals and firms consist of a 
combination of employer-employee register data from Statistics Denmark (Integrated Database for r 
Labour-market Research) from 2000 to 2010. The employee register data include among other 
information, details of the person’s employment (industry, job function, primary job, secondary job, 
degree of unemployment etc.). The employer data contains information on industry, whether or not 
the company is an exporter, firm size, geographical location, etc. Most importantly they provide 
data on end-of-November employment7. These are panel data providing annual firm data on 
revenue, productivity, exports, industry and number of employees as key variables. When merged 
with individual level data they allow us to track the employment history of each individual within 
the period of observation. This results in 119,990 observations split across 15,886 unique firms in 
Denmark in the period 2000 to 2010. 
 The data show that there is an average 6,026 designers in the Danish workforce per 
year, and Danish firms on average hire 430 new designers per year. Designers are mostly employed 
in the manufacturing industries, and the industries registering the highest number of design rights 
per firm are manufacturing, and trade and transport. 
3.1 Variables 
Dependent variable: 
                                                            
7 Statistics Denmark registers individual affiliations annually in November, thus we do not observe mobility within the 
November to November period.	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Our dependent variable is aesthetic innovation which is measured as Design rights+3 
which is a binary variable taking the value 1 if the firm registers a design right three years after 
hiring a designer. A design is defined as: “the appearance of the whole or a part of a product 
resulting from the features of, in particular, the lines, contours, colors, shape, texture and/or 
materials of the product itself and/or its ornamentation...”8 (Article 3 p. 5)  
Explanatory variables: 
Hire designer is a binary variable, which takes the value 1 if a firm has hired an 
employee who worked as a designer in his/her previous employment and 0 otherwise. The hiring of 
designers is measured in November of the given year. The variable is used in the matching 
procedure and to test hypothesis 1. 
Design right registration experience is a binary variable, which takes the value 1 if the firm has 
prior experience in registering design rights and 0 otherwise. The variable is measured from when 
the firm is first observed in the data, the first available year being 2000.  
Control variables: 
The model includes various control variables, which might explain the firm’s likelihood 
to register design rights. We include variables for the firm’s combinations of employee job 
functions, and some firm specific variables. In other words, we control for the share of employees 
working in a law related job, the share of employees in an engineering job function, the firm's hires 
of engineers, and the share of new employees other than designers and engineers, the share of 
designers employed by the firm in the previous year, firm age, firm size, whether the firm is an 
exporter or not, whether the firm is located in the country capital or not, industry dummies 
                                                            
8 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community designs (available at 
http://oami.europa.eu/en/design/pdf/reg2002_6.pdf accessed 27th of February 2015). 
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(manufacturing, construction, trade transport, information and communication technology, 
financial) and year of matching. 
3.2 Method 
A potential problem related to econometric analysis is endogeneity. If firms hire 
designers with the sole purpose of obtaining more design rights, the effect we would observe is the 
firm’s strategy to register design rights, not the effect of having hired a designer. We deal with this 
selection bias by following Guerzoni and Raiteri (2015) and applying propensity score matching. 
More specifically, we match firms that have hired designers to other similar firms that have not 
hired a designer. That is, the dependent variable used in the matching procedure is hire designer, 
with the following explanatory variables: A binary variable for whether the firm registered design 
rights in the previous year, industry (2 digit industry code), number of designer employees in the 
previous year, and firm size. 
The nature of our data allows us to restrict our sample to firms that did not hire a 
designer in the previous three years (2000-2003) or the succeeding three years (2008-2010). Thus, 
the effect we observe is related purely to the hiring of a designer in the time period 2004-2007 and 
not in either the previous or succeeding three years.  
We created separate matched samples for the years 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 and 
pooled them to obtain the final dataset. The regression results for the matched samples for each year, 
before and after the matched sample procedure, are provided in the appendix. 
After creating the matched sample we have a final sample of 1,078 firms allowing us to 
test whether hiring a designer has a positive effect on the firm’s aesthetic innovation (design rights) 
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rate. Table 1 shows the distribution of designer hires in each year; thus, the number of firms is 
double the number of design hires. The total number of design rights registered in time t+3 is 34. 
Table 1: Distribution of design hires, firms and design rights in time t+3 in final dataset 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
No. of design hires 76 118 187 158 539 
No. of firms 152 236 374 316 1,078 
No. of design rights in t+3 3 11 16 4 34 
 
We use the final dataset for the econometric analysis, which is carried out using 
logistic regression estimation since the dependent variable, design right t+3, is a binary variable. 
Robust standard errors are applied in all regressions, and both the coefficient estimates and odds 
ratios are presented in the results table 4. 
4. Findings 
This section presents the summary statistics, the results of the regression estimations 
and robustness checks. 
4.1 Summary statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics. The final sample size consists of 1,078 firms 
half of which employed a designer at time t, and3.2% of which registered a design right in time t+3. 
Of the 1,078 firms 3.3% have previous experience of aesthetic innovation measured by registration 
of design rights. On average the share of employees in a designer job function is 1% of the total 
number of employees, with a maximum of 9.6%.  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Table 3 presents the correlations of the dependent, independent and control variables. 
Both hire designer and have design rights experience are correlated with registering design rights in 
time t+3 which is a first indication that the relationships hypothesized are confirmed. The variable 
design right t-1 is highly correlated with have design right experience, which is as expected since 
both variables explain the firm's previous design experience. However, it means that design right t-
1 is not included as a control variable in the models, which include the explanatory variable have 
design right. 
Descriptive statistics (N=1,078)
Variable Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum
Design right t+3 0.032 0.175 0 1
Hire designer 0.500 0.500 0 1
Have design right exp. 0.033 0.180 0 1
Share of employees w. law job 0.001 0.007 0 0.176
Share of employees w. engineer job 0.021 0.068 0 0.602
Hire engineer 0.196 0.397 0 1
Other hires 0.949 0.220 0 1
Log firm size 4.362 1.382 0 9.559
Share of designers t-1 0.009 0.037 0 0.440
Design right t-1 0.037 0.189 0 1
Manufacturing 0.397 0.490 0 1
Construction 0.043 0.202 0 1
Trade & transport 0.232 0.422 0 1
Financial 0.178 0.383 0 1
Export firm 0.719 0.450 0 1
Capital area 0.316 0.465 0 1
Matching year 2005 1.017 2004 2007
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Table 3: Correlations 
 
4.2 Results 
Table 4 presents the results of the logistic regression estimations, and includes both the 
coefficient estimates and odds ratios. Model (1) contains only the control variables. Model (2) 
includes the variable for whether the firm hired a designer or not. Model (2) shows that hiring a 
designer has a significant and positive effect on the likelihood of registering a design right three 
years later, compared to not hiring a designer. The odds ratio suggests that the firm is 2.6 times 
more likely to register a design right at time t+3 if the firm hires a designer. Hence, hypothesis 1, 
that the labor mobility of designers is associated with a higher probability of hiring to produce 
aesthetic innovations, is supported by the empirical findings. 
Model (3) includes the explanatory variable for whether or not the firm has prior 
experience in registering design rights. The results of model (3) show that having experience of 
registering design rights has a positive and significant effect on the probability of registering a 
design right in time t+3 compared to not having experience of registering design rights. The odds 
ratio suggests that a firm is 37 times more likely to register a design right in time t+3 if it has prior 
experience of registering design rights. Hence, the results of the logistic regression estimation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
(1) Design right t+3 1
(2) Hire designer 0.0743* 1
(3) Have design right exp. 0.4096* 0.0723* 1
(4) Share of employees w. law job 0.0429 0.0273 0.0402 1
(5) Share of employees w. engineer job 0.0185 0.0520 -0.0133 0.0726* 1
(6) Hire engineer 0.0447 0.1099* 0.0384 0.0110 0.3086* 1
(7) Other hires 0.0177 0.0548 0.0431 0.0256 0.0394 0.1144* 1
(8) Log firm size 0.0481 0.0203 0.0706* 0.0461 -0.0437 0.3262* 0.3420* 1
(9) Share of designers t-1 -0.0043 0.0124 -0.0163 -0.0194 0.2338* 0.0084 -0.0703* -0.1136* 1
(10) Design right t-1 0.3577* 0.0196 0.5098 0.0353 -0.0150 0.0392 -0.0214 0.0302 -0.0035 1
(11) Manufacturing 0.0705* 0.0000 0.1235 -0.0796* -0.0442 0.0775* 0.0761* 0.0605* -0.0600* 0.1316* 1
(12) Construction -0.0118 0.0000 -0.0392 -0.0221 -0.0212 0.0462 0.0490 0.0563 0.0040 -0.0414 -0.1713* 1
(13) Trade & transport 0.0014 0.0000 -0.0043 -0.0525 -0.1352* -0.1437* -0.0624* -0.0310 -0.0632* -0.0265 -0.4459* -0.1160 1
(14) Financial -0.0146 -0.0000 -0.0595 0.0677* 0.3019* 0.0698* -0.0463 -0.0595 0.2209* -0.0401 -0.3777* -0.0983 -0.2558* 1
(15) Export firm 0.0774* -0.0186 0.0933* -0.0009 -0.0505 0.0484 0.0707* 0.0907* -0.0783* 0.0791* 0.3218* -0.2151* 0.0062 -0.2483* 1
(16) Capital area -0.0086 0.0658* -0.0487 0.1269* 0.0542 0.0566 0.0489 0.1428* -0.0689* -0.0280 -0.3155* -0.0153 0.0516 0.1734* -0.0451 1
(17) Matching year -0.0362 0.0000 0.0126 0.0422 -0.0153 0.0203 0.0397 -0.0342 -0.0550 -0.0226 0.0092 -0.0020 -0.0390 0.0141 0.0021 0.0311 1
 (*) significant at 5%
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support hypothesis 2 that that the firm's prior experience of aesthetic innovation is associated with a 
higher probability that the firm will produce new aesthetic innovation output. 
Model (4) shows the results of the logistic regression estimation including the 
interaction between the two variables for whether the firm hires a designer and whether it has prior 
experience of registering design rights. Model (4) shows that experience of registering design rights 
in the absence of hiring a designer has a positive and significant effect on the probability of 
registering a design right in time t+3 compared to not having experience of registering design rights 
and not hiring a designer. In addition, if the firm has both experience of registering design rights 
and hires a designer, the probability of registering a design right in time t+3 is higher compared to 
not having experience of registering design rights and not hiring a designer. The odds ratio suggests 
that a firm is 69 times more likely to register a design right in time t+3 if it has both experience in 
registering designs and hires a designer, compared to not having experience in registering design 
rights and not hiring a designer. We use a Wald test to test having design rights registration 
experience only, against having both design rights registration experience and hiring a designer. We 
cannot reject that the effect of the two variables is the same, that is, we do not find full support for 
hypothesis 3 that for firms with experience of aesthetic innovation, hiring a designer is associated 
with a higher probability of developing additional aesthetic innovations when compared to a firm 
without experience of aesthetic innovation. 
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To further investigate the effect of the interaction term on the probability of registering a design 
right in time t+3, we plotted the marginal effects. Figure 1 shows the predicted marginal effects of 
the interaction term. The effect of hiring a designer without having design registration experience is 
positive but not significant. However, for firms with experience of registering design rights the 
Table 4: Results of logistic regression models and odds ratios 
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effect of hiring a designer is associated with a significantly higher probability of registering design 
rights in time t+3.  
Figure 1: Predictive marginal effects 
 
4.3 Robustness checks 
As a robustness check we introduce design right t+1 and design right t+2 as dependent 
variables, and conduct negative binomial regression using number of design rights t+1, number of 
design rights t+2 and number of design rights t+3 respectively as the dependent variable. The 
findings hold for the negative binomial model with number of design rights t+3 as the dependent 
variable. The results hold also if we include design right t+1 as the dependent variable and design 
right t+2 as the dependent variable in a logistic regression model. The results are also the same for 
the negative binomial model. The results of the robustness checks are presented in the appendix. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper we explored whether hiring a designer affects the likelihood that the firm 
would develop aesthetic innovations, exploiting unique data on labor mobility of designers and 
firms' design registrations. Unlike the relation between scientists' mobility and technological 
innovation, there are very few studies that investigate the determinants of aesthetic innovation. 
Specifically, the sources of aesthetic innovation, which we identified and tested empirically, are 
limited, and the properties of the aesthetic innovation process different from the process of 
technological innovation. Existing work uses industry or firm case studies , which limits the 
generalizability of the results (i.e. Salter and Gann 2003, Tran 2010).  
Our results show a positive relation between hiring a designer and the likelihood that 
the firm will develop new aesthetic innovations. This suggests that firms seeking to develop 
aesthetic innovations to enhance an existing product or create a new product, can acquire the 
necessary capabilities through recruitment. Our results suggest also that firms that hire designers 
exploit their skills to develop innovations shown by the direct effect of employing a designer. We 
find that the development of aesthetic innovation is dependent on prior experience. Firms already 
conducting aesthetic innovation developments are more likely to produce further aesthetic 
innovations in the future. While this points to a competence leveraging effect, it does not explain 
how the firm develops its first aesthetic innovation. Future research should look more closely at 
how the initial development of aesthetic innovation takes place in both new and established firms.  
We find that in order for the firm to benefit most from hiring a designer, measured by a 
higher probability of registering design rights, it needs prior experience of innovation and 
registering design rights. That is, without the necessary absorptive capacity, the firm will be unable 
to exploit the designer's full potential, and therefore the probability of registering design rights will 
21 
 
not increase. While recruiting a designer to the firm can have a positive effect on aesthetic 
innovation, this effect is contingent on the firm's having the necessary knowledge in place. This 
could be a problem for firms seeking to develop aesthetic innovation activity. Our results suggest 
that it is not sufficient to acquire the necessary capabilities through the process of learning-by-
hiring but that the firm needs to certain capabilities before the benefits of hiring designers can be 
realized.  
As discussed above, our results do not provide sufficient insight into what determines 
the firm's ability to develop the first aesthetic innovation, which presents an opportunity for future 
research. The possible determinants of aesthetic innovation may be heterogeneous distribution of 
formal skills within the firm among designers, engineers and scientists, which allow novel 
recombinations of skills and broader search, or the involvement of designers in the product 
development process. 
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7. Appendix 
A1. Results before and after the matching procedure for the years 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Before matching After matching Before matching After matching
Log firm size 0.720*** 0.058 0.747*** 0.009
(0.08) (0.12) (0.07) (0.10)
Share of designers t-1 5.132*** -5.392 4.805*** -1.819
(1.91) (4.19) (1.72) (3.85)
Design right t-1 0.926 1.072 1.894*** 0.721
(0.63) (1.17) (0.41) (0.63)
Constant -7.494*** -0.208 -7.204*** -0.058
(0.37) (0.56) (0.31) (0.47)
Observations 9,067 152 9,050 236
χ2 -test χ2(3) =86 χ2(3) = 4 χ2(3) =150 χ2(3) =2
R2 0.10 0.02 0.12 0.01
Robust standard errors in square brackets ; (*) significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1%
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Before matching After matching Before matching After matching
Log firm size 0.674*** 0.034 0.689*** 0.016
(0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08)
Share of designers t-1 5.778*** 7.465* 6.667*** 4.647
(1.10) (4.26) (1.47) (3.91)
Design right t-1 1.118** -0.456 0.975** 0.517
(0.44) (0.54) (0.49) (0.74)
Constant -6.412*** -0.189 -6.643*** -0.115
(0.24) (0.35) (0.27) (0.36)
Observations 9,240 374 9,173 316
χ2 -test χ2(3) =172 χ2(3) =5 χ2(3) =150 χ2(3) =2
R2 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.005
Robust standard errors in square brackets ; (*) significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1%
2006 2007
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A2. Robustness check – hypothesis 1, logistic regression model 
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (2)
Dep. var.: Dep. var.: Dep. var.:
design right t+1 design right t+2 design right t+3
Hire designer 1.275*** 0.502 0.870**
(0.42) (0.37) (0.38)
Share of employees w. law job 51.512*** 26.589 61.216***
(19.21) (17.23) (18.84)
Share of employees w. engineer job -0.409 -0.463 0.946
(2.28) (2.44) (2.20)
Hire engineer 0.450 0.613 0.012
(0.42) (0.47) (0.48)
Other hires -0.171 -0.115 -0.767
(1.13) (1.09) (0.85)
Log firm size 0.161 0.168 0.155
(0.16) (0.17) (0.17)
Share of designers t-1 0.527 2.920 -0.451
(4.07) (3.44) (3.36)
Manufacturing 21.423*** 1.979 21.410***
(3.49) (1.62) (3.41)
Construction 21.433***
(3.74)
Trade & transport 20.736*** 2.190 21.231***
(3.55) (1.69) (3.46)
Financial 20.748*** 1.386 21.069***
(3.28) (1.85) (3.32)
Export firm 1.349** 1.425* 1.662**
(0.64) (0.73) (0.74)
Capital area -0.197 -0.255 -0.006
(0.52) (0.50) (0.46)
Matching year = 2005 0.300 0.270 0.802
(0.53) (0.62) (0.67)
Matching year = 2006 -1.083* -0.037 0.844
(0.60) (0.61) (0.66)
Matching year = 2007 -0.468 -0.078 -0.541
(0.56) (0.63) (0.82)
Constant -26.645*** -7.619*** -27.005***
(4.02) (2.45) (3.86)
Observations 1,031 1,031 1,078
χ2 -test . χ2(15) = 27 χ2(16) = 166
R2 0.17 0.09 0.14
Robust standard errors in square brackets ; (*) significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1%
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A3. Robustness check – hypothesis 1, negative binomial model 
 
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (2)
Dep. var.: Dep. var.: Dep. var.:
 no. design right t+1 no. design right t+2 no. design right t+3
Hire designer 2.488*** 1.139** 2.064***
(0.70) (0.45) (0.46)
Share of employees w. law job 24.393 100.801*** 90.019***
(21.65) (25.28) (17.16)
Share of employees w. engineer job -1.387 3.407 6.374*
(3.91) (4.09) (3.75)
Hire engineer 0.399 -0.361 -1.864***
(0.63) (0.51) (0.64)
Other hires -0.276 -1.386 -3.379**
(1.06) (1.04) (1.35)
Log firm size 0.547*** 0.299 0.391***
(0.17) (0.22) (0.15)
Share of designers t-1 1.826 1.518 12.020
(8.04) (6.51) (10.95)
Manufacturing 2.332 32.235***
(1.67) (3.17)
Construction -19.872*** -18.075*** 29.114***
(0.80) (1.79) (2.62)
Trade & transport -0.488 2.571 32.091***
(0.65) (1.91) (2.75)
Financial -0.021 -0.200 30.514***
(0.85) (2.20) (3.07)
Export firm 2.477*** 2.897** 3.213***
(0.69) (1.42) (0.56)
Capital area -1.276* -0.561 0.522
(0.69) (0.61) (0.54)
Matching year = 2005 1.188 -0.251 -0.428
(1.55) (0.71) (0.77)
Matching year = 2006 -1.694 -1.712*** -1.046
(1.18) (0.65) (0.76)
Matching year = 2007 -1.936* -1.089* -3.220***
(1.14) (0.66) (0.94)
Constant -6.803*** -6.502* -34.914***
(2.57) (3.50) (3.52)
Observations 1,077 1,077 1,078
χ2 -test χ2(15) = 1,035 χ2(16) = 1,818 .
Robust standard errors in square brackets ; (*) significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1%
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A4. Robustness check – hypothesis 2, logistic regression model 
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (2)
Dep. var.: Dep. var.: Dep. var.:
design right t+1 design right t+2 design right t+3
Have design right exp. 4.480*** 4.132*** 3.703***
(0.56) (0.48) (0.50)
Share of employees w. law job 18.525 18.910* 38.698***
(17.91) (10.97) (14.97)
Share of employees w. engineer job 0.861 -0.850 2.018
(2.01) (3.02) (2.06)
Hire engineer 0.754 0.928* 0.195
(0.63) (0.54) (0.57)
Other hires -0.234 -0.319 -0.850
(1.22) (1.17) (0.92)
Log firm size -0.079 -0.051 -0.046
(0.22) (0.18) (0.22)
Share of designers t-1 -2.101 3.297 -1.517
(5.07) (3.90) (3.55)
Manufacturing 14.165*** 0.573 16.950***
(0.71) (1.12) (2.87)
Construction 17.739***
(3.29)
Trade & transport 13.670*** 1.200 16.875***
(0.80) (1.15) (2.91)
Financial 14.141*** 0.691 17.109***
(0.60) (1.45) (2.76)
Export firm 1.137* 1.499 1.569*
(0.64) (0.93) (0.80)
Capital area -0.033 -0.222 0.119
(0.71) (0.64) (0.51)
Matching year = 2005 0.091 0.156 0.682
(0.67) (0.72) (0.65)
Matching year = 2006 -1.591* -0.052 0.905
(0.82) (0.67) (0.61)
Matching year = 2007 -0.998 -0.223 -0.777
(0.78) (0.73) (0.84)
Constant -17.973*** -5.866** -21.701***
(1.67) (2.30) (3.39)
Observations 1,031 1,031 1,078
χ2 -test χ2(15) = 3,107 χ2(15) = 102 χ2(16) = 311
R2 0.40 0.34 0.30
Robust standard errors in square brackets ; (*) significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant 
at 1%
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A5. Robustness check – hypothesis 2, negative binomial model 
 
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (2)
Dep. var.: Dep. var.: Dep. var.:
 no. design right t+1 no. design right t+2 no. design right t+3
Have design right exp. 5.760*** 5.027*** 5.684***
(0.45) (0.46) (0.87)
Share of employees w. law job -6.277 22.944 -1.820
(12.52) (19.41) (13.84)
Share of employees w. engineer job 1.632 1.080 8.522**
(2.26) (2.65) (3.92)
Hire engineer 0.746 -0.167 -0.126
(0.54) (0.67) (0.69)
Other hires -1.253 -1.927* -4.063***
(1.62) (1.04) (1.09)
Log firm size 0.061 0.047 -0.005
(0.17) (0.20) (0.17)
Share of designers t-1 -8.477 4.048 -3.504
(7.29) (6.00) (6.46)
Manufacturing 16.114*** 1.383 16.830***
(0.62) (1.19) (0.90)
Construction -17.022*** 15.313***
(1.28) (1.02)
Trade & transport 15.520*** 2.065 16.674***
(0.60) (1.26) (0.92)
Financial 15.552*** 1.105 15.480***
(0.56) (1.44) (0.68)
Export firm 1.971*** 2.424** 1.825***
(0.58) (1.10) (0.52)
Capital area 0.877* 0.480 1.432***
(0.52) (0.50) (0.51)
Matching year = 2005 -0.496 0.577 1.526*
(0.75) (0.59) (0.79)
Matching year = 2006 -2.596*** 0.132 0.740
(0.87) (0.77) (0.69)
Matching year = 2007 -2.372*** -0.444 -2.579***
(0.87) (0.53) (0.72)
Constant -19.061*** -5.745** -17.751***
(1.65) (2.38) (1.25)
Observations 1,077 1,077 1,078
χ2 -test χ2(15) = 6,012 χ2(16) = 4,214 χ2(16) = 1627
Robust standard errors in square brackets ; (*) significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1%
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A6. Robustness check – hypothesis 3, logistic regression model 
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (2)
Dep. var.: Dep. var.: Dep. var.:
design right t+1 design right t+2 design right t+3
No hire designer x have design right exp. 3.900*** 3.625*** 2.945***
(0.86) (0.95) (1.05)
Hire designer x no have design right exp. 0.856 -0.378 0.373
(0.58) (0.54) (0.48)
Hire designer x have design right exp. 5.364*** 4.046*** 4.189***
(0.76) (0.60) (0.62)
Share of employees w. law job 16.757 19.338* 36.831**
(18.04) (11.34) (14.81)
Share of employees w. engineer job 0.836 -0.743 2.131
(2.01) (3.08) (2.06)
Hire engineer 0.516 0.516 0.006
(0.66) (0.55) (0.58)
Other hires -0.405 -0.268 -0.911
(1.25) (1.16) (0.91)
Log firm size -0.051 -0.055 -0.028
(0.22) (0.18) (0.21)
Share of designers t-1 -1.899 3.222 -1.856
(5.51) (3.91) (3.80)
Manufacturing 14.962*** 0.566 16.277***
(0.96) (1.10) (2.79)
Construction 17.067***
(3.21)
Trade & transport 14.325*** 1.192 16.137***
(1.07) (1.14) (2.85)
Financial 14.942*** 0.642 16.448***
(0.90) (1.44) (2.73)
Export firm 1.277* 1.529 1.623**
(0.69) (0.93) (0.80)
Capital area -0.055 -0.220 0.104
(0.74) (0.65) (0.52)
Matching year = 2005 0.146 0.206 0.774
(0.70) (0.75) (0.66)
Matching year = 2006 -1.657* -0.019 0.956
(0.87) (0.70) (0.62)
Matching year = 2007 -0.957 -0.178 -0.725
(0.78) (0.75) (0.84)
Constant -19.283*** -5.764** -21.292***
(1.94) (2.27) (3.29)
Observations 1,031 1,031 1,078
χ2 -test χ2(17) = 1,591 χ2(17) = 108 χ2(18) = 245
R2 0.42 0.34 0.31
Robust standard errors in square brackets ; (*) significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1%
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A7. Robustness check – hypothesis 3, negative binomial model 
  
Model (1) Model (2) Model (2)
Dep. var.: Dep. var.: Dep. var.:
 no. design right t+1 no. design right t+2 no. design right t+3
No hire designer x have design right exp. 4.432*** 3.443*** 4.231***
(0.87) (0.82) (1.10)
Hire designer x no have design right exp. 0.945* -1.062** 0.605
(0.53) (0.47) (0.41)
Hire designer x have design right exp. 6.678*** 5.073*** 6.413***
(0.64) (0.48) (1.05)
Share of employees w. law job -9.407 -2.318
(13.66) (14.52)
Share of employees w. engineer job 1.254 1.134 7.873**
(2.23) (2.89) (3.69)
Hire engineer 0.494 0.148 -0.225
(0.53) (0.59) (0.69)
Other hires -1.241 -1.555* -4.208***
(1.41) (0.91) (1.10)
Log firm size 0.084 -0.025 0.007
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Share of designers t-1 -7.268 3.584 -2.885
(7.87) (5.99) (6.27)
Manufacturing 16.392*** 1.296 16.894***
(0.63) (1.02) (0.77)
Construction -12.992*** 15.024***
(0.61) (0.88)
Trade & transport 15.847*** 2.029* 16.428***
(0.68) (1.13) (0.75)
Financial 15.703*** 1.416 15.420***
(0.52) (1.46) (0.57)
Export firm 2.018*** 2.284*** 1.889***
(0.61) (0.88) (0.50)
Capital area 1.022* 0.459 1.434***
(0.56) (0.46) (0.52)
Matching year = 2005 -0.216 0.597 1.383*
(0.69) (0.64) (0.75)
Matching year = 2006 -2.521*** 0.125 0.922
(0.81) (0.78) (0.71)
Matching year = 2007 -2.294*** -0.489 -2.282***
(0.84) (0.63) (0.79)
Constant -20.202*** -5.284*** -18.030***
(1.49) (1.96) (1.20)
Observations 1,077 1,077 1,078
χ2 -test . χ2(16) = 254 χ2(18) = 2,613
Robust standard errors in square brackets ; (*) significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1%
